Criminal law by Thommen, Marc
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2018
Criminal law
Thommen, Marc
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24921/2018.94115924
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-167338
Book Section
 
 
The following work is licensed under a Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
License.
Originally published at:
Thommen, Marc (2018). Criminal law. In: Thommen, Marc. Introduction to Swiss Law. Berlin: Carl
Grossmann Verlag, 369-394.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24921/2018.94115924
I. Criminal Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .371
 1. History .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  371
 2. Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
 3. Content  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
 4. Dualism of Sanctions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
 5. Death Penalty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
 6. Euthanasia / Assisted Suicide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382
II. Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385
 1. Nulla Poena Sine Lege . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385
 2. Nulla Poena Sine Culpa .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 387
III. Landmark Cases .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . 390
 1. Rolling Stones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
 2. Domestic Tyrant.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  391
 3. Deadly Car Race .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  391
 4. Hiking in the Nude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392
Selected Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
© 2018 Marc Thommen, CC-BY 4.0, DOI: 10.24921/2018.94115924.14
Marc Thommen
Criminal Law

371
I. CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣ
This first section is intended to introduce and explain the development of the 
Swiss Criminal Code, starting with a brief history of the codification of crimi-
nal law across Switzerland (1.). Next, the gradual development of the criminal 
code we have today, designed by Carl Stooss, is examined (2.). The content and 
form of this current criminal code will be outlined (3.), before some particu-
larities of the code are analysed in more detail: namely, the dualism of sanc-
tions (4.), the death penalty in Swiss law (5.), and the regulations on assisted 
suicide and euthanasia (6.). 
ᇳ. H؜ئاآإج
eƩƣ Ƥiƽƾƿ ơƺƸƻƽƣƩƣƹƾiǁƣ ơƺƢiƤiơƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ơƽiƸiƹƞl lƞǂ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢè ᅬ ƿƩƣ 
Code pénal de la République helvétique 1799è ᅬ ǂƞƾ iƹƾƻiƽƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ iƢƣƞlƾ ƺƤ 
the French Revolution, such as equality in sentencing and the abolishment 
of general confiscations.1 However, this codification was not to last for long: 
after the decline of the Helvetic Republic in 1803, the cantons regained their 
right to create and apply their own criminal codes. The canton of Fribourg, for 
example, reintroduced the Constitutio Criminalis of Emperor Carl V of 1532 
(“Carolina”);2 this Code provided on one hand for some brutal forms of pun-
ishment such as drawing and quartering, on the other hand it had once been 
quite modern for it also “advanced” individual rights and protected suspects 
from excessive legal arbitrariness (e.g. no torture without probable cause, no 
leading questions, compensation if tortured illegally, etc.). Of course, in the 
19th century the Carolina was hopelessly outdated.
1 dاؘؙؔء eإؘؖ؛ئؘ؟/Mؔإا؜ء K؜؟؟؜ؔئ, CƽiƸiƹƞl Lƞǂ, iƹ Fƽƞƹơƺiƾ DƣƾƾƣƸƺƹƿƣƿ/eǀƨƽǀl 
Ansay, (eds.), Introduction to Swiss Law, 3rd edition, The Hague 2004, pp. 245, p. 246.
2 Nؔؗ؜ءؘ kبإ؞؜ءؘؗء, National characteristics, fundamental principles, and history of 
ơƽiƸiƹƞl lƞǂ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, iƹ flƽiơƩ diƣƟƣƽ/Kƺƹƾƿƞƹǅƣ Jƞƽǁƣƽƾ/EƸilǄ dilǁƣƽƸƞƹ ᄬƣƢƾ.ᄭ, 
National Criminal Law in a Comparative Legal Context, Vol 1.1, Berlin 2013, pp. 205, p. 295.
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The Switzerland we know today was founded in 1848 in the aftermath of 
the Sonderbund war, which was a civil war between Catholic and Protestant 
cantons. The seven Catholic cantons who formed the Sonderbund opposed 
the impending centralisation of Switzerland as they feared that their inte-
rests would be marginalized by the majority of Protestant cantons. It was the 
Protestants that prevailed in the Sonderbund war, but it is the lasting legacy of 
ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ ƤƺǀƹƢiƹƨ ƤƞƿƩƣƽƾèᅬ ƞƹƢ ƣƾƻƣơiƞllǄ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƣƾiƢƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ơƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺ-
nal convention f؟إ؜ؖ؛ Oؖ؛ئؘءؘؕ؜ءèᅬ ƿƩƞƿ ƿƩƣ iƹƿƣƽƣƾƿƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƤƣƞƿƣƢ ǂƣƽƣ 
also taken into account, when drafting the Constitution which followed this 
conflict. Hence, it was not a central Swiss Republic but the Swiss Confederation 
that emerged at this point. 
Fiƨǀƽƣ ᇳ: flƽiơƩ OơƩƾƣƹƟƣiƹ, ᇳᇺᇳᇳᅬᇳᇺᇻᇲ3
One of the main features of this federal system founded in 1848 is the auto-
nomy of the 25 cantons:4 the cantons kept their legislative independence. So 
even after Switzerland was founded as a modern federal state, the cantons 
retained their own criminal codes. Considering the size of the cantons (for 
example, even today the canton of Glarus has a population of only 40’000 
inhabitants) this variety of criminal codes proved to be very inefficient. 
Therefore, the Swiss Lawyers Association held, at its general assembly of 1887, 
3 dƺǀƽơƣ: Bƽiƿƞƹƹiơƞ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/ECᇹg- CeEᇶᄭ.
4 There were 25 cantons at this point in history. The canton which was added later is that 
ƺƤ Jǀƽƞ, ǂƩiơƩ ƞơơƣƢƣƢ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ FƣƢƣƽƞƿiƺƹ iƹ ᇳᇻᇹᇻ, ƟƣơƺƸiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ᇴᇸth Swiss canton.
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that an “efficient and successful fight against crime is not possible as long as the 
fragmentation of cantonal criminal codes persists.”5
ᇴ. Lؘؚ؜ئ؟ؔا؜آء
Following this declaration by the Swiss Lawyers Association, the Swiss Federal 
Council asked Cؔإ؟ dاآآئئ, a professor of criminal law at the University of 
Bern, to draw up a comparative compendium of all the cantonal criminal 
codes. In 1892, Cؔإ؟ dاآآئئ published his comparative analysis. He pointed 
out that the foundations of Swiss criminal law were “quite cosmopolitan”, 
drawing from Romanic and German sources. While the French influence of 
the Code pénal of 1799 persisted in the cantons of the Romandie (western, 
French- speaking part of Switzerland), the codes of the central and eastern 
(German- speaking) cantons were more inspired by the Austro- Hungarian 
codification.
Interestingly, three cantons were missing in Cؔإ؟ dاآآئئ’ compilation: Uri, 
Unterwalden and Appenzell Innerrhoden. The reason for this was that these 
small cantons had no formal criminal codes, only a few written sources of 
law at that time. Fribourg, as mentioned, still relied on the “Carolina”. Cؔإ؟ 
dاآآئئ’ compilation of the cantonal codes focused on what was viewed as the 
core of the criminal law (murder, assault, theft, fraud, rape, etc.). The minor 
“police offences” (vagrancy, begging, alcoholism, gambling, and lottery) were 
not covered. The cantonal rules on the death penalty became a part of the 
compilation even though capital punishment was already highly controver-
sial by this time.
In 1893, Cؔإ؟ dاآآئئ published his first draft of the Criminal Code. At 
that time, nobody anticipated that the legislative procedure would take a 
record- breaking 50 years to achieve completion. Up until 1916, three com-
missions of experts deliberated on various drafts of the code. In 1918, the 
Swiss Federal Council handed its dispatch6 to Parliament. It was another 
ten years before the Federal Assembly entered the debate in 1928; following 
5 This is an own translation of a quote from Carl Stooss’ 1890 comparative compendium on 
ơƞƹƿƺƹƞl ơƽiƸiƹƞl ơƺƢƣƾ, ƻ. Ii ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/dᇴEE-LeᇸMᄭ.
6 The term “dispatch” (German: Botschaft; French: message) is the official term used by the 
Swiss government for explanatory reports to draft legislation; resembling a White Paper 
iƹ ƿƩƣ fK; ƾƣƣ CƩƞƻƿƣƽ dǂiƾƾ Lƣƨƞl dǄƾƿƣƸ, ƻ. ᇴᇺ. 
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this, they actually spent a further ten years deliberating the Code. Finally, 
on 21 December 1937, the still highly controversial Swiss Criminal Code was 
adopted. The opponents claimed that a unified codification for Switzerland 
undermined cantonal autonomy in the crucial field of criminal law. Catholic 
groups also opposed the Code because it legalised (medically warranted) 
abortions.7
The Code’s abolition of the death penalty was also still a controversial 
issue.8 eƩƣ CƺƢƣ ƿƩǀƾ ƩƞƢ ƿƺ Ɵƣ ƾǀƟƸiƿƿƣƢ ƿƺ ƞ ƽƣƤƣƽƣƹƢǀƸ. Oƹ ᇵ JǀlǄ ᇳᇻᇵᇺ, ƞ 
slim majority of 53.5 % of the electorate approved the new criminal code. The 
CƺƢƣ ƺƤƤiơiƞllǄ ơƞƸƣ iƹƿƺ Ƥƺƽơƣ ƺƹ ᇳ JƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇳᇻᇶᇴ.
ᇵ. Cآءاؘءا9
In the Swiss criminal law of today, there are three types of offences: felo-
nies, misdemeanours, and contraventions. Felonies are offences that carry 
a custodial sentence of more than three years, the maximum custodial sen-
tence usually being 20 years. Some felonies (e.g. murder, aggravated hostage- 
taking) carry a life sentence (Article 40). Misdemeanours are offences that 
carry a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or a monetary penalty 
ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇲᄭ. MƺƹƣƿƞƽǄ ƻƣƹƞlƿiƣƾ ƞƽƣ ơƺƸƻƺƾƣƢ ƺƤ ƻƣƹƞlƿǄ ǀƹiƿƾ. eƩƣ ƼǀƞƹƿiƿǄ 
of the units (a maximum of 180; Article 34 I) reflects the culpability of the 
offender, while the amount charged per unit reflects the offender’s finan-
ơiƞl ƾiƿǀƞƿiƺƹ ᄬơǀƽƽƣƹƿlǄ CHF ᇵᇲèᅬ ᇵ’ᇲᇲᇲ, ǂƩilƣ ƞllƺǂiƹƨ ơƺǀƽƿƾ ƿƩƣ ƻƺƾƾiƟiliƿǄ 
of lowering this minimum to CHF 10 where special financial circumstances 
exist; Article 34 II). Finally, contraventions are criminal acts that are punis-
hable only with a fine (Article 103). The maximum fine is usually CHF 10’000 
(Article 106).
7 kبإ؞؜ءؘؗء, p. 296 with further references.
8 kبإ؞؜ءؘؗء, p. 296 with further references.
9 In the following text, where Articles are mentioned without referencing their source 
of law, they are located in the Swiss Criminal Code of 21 December 1997, SR 311.0; see 
Ƥƺƽ ƞƹ EƹƨliƾƩ ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.
ơơ/ᇶbdᇶ- Chbᇷᄭ. 
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Figure 2: Structure of the Swiss Criminal Code
The Swiss Criminal Code contains 392 Articles. It is divided up into three 
books. 
Part I ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾèᇳᅬᇳᇳᇲᄭ ƸƞiƹlǄ ƽƣƨǀlƞƿƣƾ ƿƩƣ general provisions on criminal 
liability (omissions, intention and negligence, justifications, guilt, respon-
sibility, attempt, and participation) and sanctions (e.g. custodial sentences, 
monetary penalties, suspension of sentences, parole, therapeutic measures, 
and indefinite incarceration). For example, there are two types of intention in 
Swiss criminal law: these are contained in Article 12. Article 12 encompasses 
both direct intent and conditional intent. Direct intent is possessed when the 
offender both knows that a particular consequence is possible and wants this 
consequence to occur.10 Conditional intent, or dolus eventualis, is possessed 
when the offender realises that the consequence is possible and accepts this 
ƽiƾkèᅬ ƞlƟƣiƿ ƹƺƿ ƹƣơƣƾƾƞƽilǄ ǂƞƹƿiƹƨ ƿƩƣ ƩƞƽƸ ƿƺ ƺơơǀƽ. Iƹ ƿƩiƾ ƾƺƽƿ ƺƤ ơƞƾƣ, ƿƩƣ 
offender is indifferent about whether or not the harm will occur.11
The Swiss legislator’s decision to introduce a general part that sets up the 
common elements of crime and sentencing followed a long tradition. The 
Italian Renaissance jurist e؜ؘؕإ؜آ Dؘؖ؜ؔء؜ ᄬᇳᇷᇲᇻᅬᇳᇷᇺᇴᄭ iƾ ơƽƣƢiƿƣƢ ǂiƿƩ Ɵƣiƹƨ 
the first to coin the idea of splitting up criminal codes into general and speci-
fic parts in his Tractatus Criminalis of 1590. Criminal codes which were crea-
ted before this, such as the Carolina (1532), only contained specific, casuistic 
10 éءءؔ aؘاإ؜ؚ/Nؔؗ؜ءؘ kبإ؞؜ءؘؗء, dǂiƾƾ CƽiƸiƹƞl Lƞǂ, kǀƽiơƩ/dƿ. Gƞllƣƹ ᇴᇲᇳᇷ, ƻ. ᇸᇻ.
11 aؘاإ؜ؚ/kبإ؞؜ءؘؗء, p. 70.
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provisions. The move towards including both general and specific parts allo-
wed criminal codes to be kept much shorter. By creating general rules for all 
crimes, the legislator also better fulfilled the nulla poena sine lege principle;12 
having general rules removes any gaps in criminal liability that would other-
wise have to be filled by analogy. Further, by predetermining liability in a 
general manner, the legislator hoped to minimize the influence of courts and 
academics on the interpretation of criminal codes. 
Part II ơƺǁƣƽƾ ƿƩƣ ƾƻƣơiƤiơ ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹƾ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇳᇳᇳᅬᇵᇵᇴᄭ: iƿ ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƣƾ ơƽiƸi-
nal offences which protect individual interests such as life and limb (mur-
der, assault), property (theft, fraud), honour (defamation), liberty (coercion, 
hostage taking, unlawful entry) or sexual integrity (rape, exploitation, por-
nography, sexual harassment). In addition, criminal offences which protect 
collective interests such as families (incest, bigamy), public safety (arson), 
public health (transmission of diseases), public order (rioting, criminal orga-
nisations, racial discrimination), genocide and war crimes, trading interests 
(counterfeiting, forgery), national security (high treason, espionage), judicial 
interests (false accusation, money laundering, perjury), and state interests 
(abuse of public office, bribery) were also included. 
Part III ᄬéƽƿiơlƣƾ ᇵᇵᇵᅬᇵᇻᇴᄭ Ƣƣƞlƾ ǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ iƹƿƽƺƢǀơƿiƺƹ ƞƹƢ ƞƻƻliơƞƿiƺƹ ƺƤ 
the Swiss Criminal Code. 
MƞƹǄ ơƽiƸiƹƞl ƻƽƺǁiƾiƺƹƾ ƣǃiƾƿ ƺǀƿǂiƿƩ ƿƩƣ CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣ: Ƥƺƽ ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ, 
road traffic offences, drug crimes, and illegal use of weapons all form part of 
specific federal codes.13 In practice, these laws are highly relevant, in particu-
lar road traffic offences.14 
12 A key principle in Swiss law, meaning “no penalty without law” (see pp. 385.).
13 Federal Act on Road Traffic of 19 December 1958, SR 741.01; Federal Act on Narcotics and 
Psychotropic Substances of 3 October 1951 (Narcotics Act, NarcA), SR 812.121, see for an 
EƹƨliƾƩ ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/BfᇴC- ᇶᇻᇷFᄭ; FƣƢƣƽƞl éơƿ ƺƹ hƣƞƻƺƹƾ, 
hƣƞƻƺƹ EƼǀiƻƸƣƹƿ ƞƹƢ éƸƸǀƹiƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ᇴᇲ Jǀƹƣ ᇳᇻᇻᇹ, dc ᇷᇳᇶ.ᇷᇶ.
14 In 2016, there were 57’518 convictions of adults for road traffic offences, which is 52 % 
ƺƤ ƞll ᇳᇲᇻ’ᇳᇳᇸ ơƺƹǁiơƿiƺƹƾ ƺƤ ƞƢǀlƿƾ ᄬƾƺǀƽơƣ: FƣƢƣƽƞl dƿƞƿiƾƿiơƞl OƤƤiơƣ: Ʃƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/
baᇴᇵ- Eᇺᇵiᄭ.
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ᇶ. Dبؔ؟؜ئؠ آؙ dؔءؖا؜آءئ
Sanctions are the consequences imposed for criminal acts. In Switzerland 
there are two main categories of sanctions: sentences and measures. 
Sentences (monetary penalties, custodial sentences, fines) are retributive 
in nature. They are mainly backward- looking: their aim is to reprimand and 
ƻǀƹiƾƩ ƺƤƤƣƹƢƣƽƾ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣiƽ ǂƽƺƹƨƢƺiƹƨ. Mƣƞƾǀƽƣƾ, ƺƹ ƿƩƣ ƺƿƩƣƽ ƩƞƹƢ, ƞƽƣ ƻƽƣ-
ventive in nature. Thus, they are predominantly forward- looking: they are 
designed to protect society from dangerous offenders by either curing them 
of any mental deficiencies or addictions (therapeutic measures) or by perma-
nently incapacitating them (indefinite incarceration).
Measures
Protective Measures
Therapy
In-Patient Measures for
Young Adults
Article 61
Retrospective In-Patient 
Measure
Article 65 I
Isolation
Indefinite Incarceration
Article 64
Retrospective Indefinite 
Incarceration
Article 65 II
Other measures
Personal
Prohibition From Carrying
on an Activity, Contact
Prohibition, and
Exclusion Order 
Articles 67 et seqq.
Disqualification From
Driving
Article 67e
Publication of the
Judgment
Article 68
Material
Forfeiture of Assets
Articles 70 et seqq.
Sentences
Monetary Penalty
Article 34
Fines
Article 106
Death Penalty / Corporal
Punishment
Sanctions
Use for the Benefit of the
Person Harmed
Article 73
Expulsion 
Articles 66a et seqq.
In-Patient Treatment of
Addiction
Article 60
In-Patient Treatment of
Mental Disorders
Article 59
Good Behaviour Bond
Article 66
Forfeiture of Dangerous
Objects 
Article 69
Custodial Sentence
Articles 40 et seq.
Out-patient Treatment
Article 63
Community Service
Article 37
*
* Community service is no longer a separate type of sentence. However all sentences up to 6 months can be converted 
into community service (Art. 79a).
* * The death penalty was abolished when the Swiss Criminal Code came into force on 1 January 1942, see I.5.
**
Figure 3: Dual System of Sanctions
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This dual system of sanctions was Cؔإ؟ dاآآئئ’ invention. The idea recei-
ved universal acclaim, and other jurisdictions soon followed the approach.15 
Cؔإ؟ dاآآئئ’ ƹƣǂ ơƺƹơƣƻƿ ǂƞƾ ƾǀơơƣƾƾƤǀlèƟƣơƞǀƾƣ iƿ ƞƻƻƣƞƾƣƢ ƺƹƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ 
fiercest debates to occur in criminal law: the debate over the legitimacy of 
criminal punishment. Scholars fought over this idea throughout the 18th and 
19th century. What gives the state the right to inflict harm upon offenders? 
There were three possible answers: (1) They deserve it, i.e. just desert.16 ᄬᇴᄭèIƿ 
will teach them a lesson about their behaviour and thus deter future offen-
ding, i.e. special prevention.17 (3) The threat and enforcement of criminal 
punishment will deter wider society from offending as well, i.e. general 
prevention.18 
Jǀƾƿ Ƣƣƾƣƽƿ ƿƩƣƺƽiƣƾ ƺƤ ƻǀƹiƾƩƸƣƹƿ ƞƽƣ ƺƹlǄ ƞƟƺǀƿ ƽƣƿƽiƟǀƿiƺƹ Ƥƺƽ ƻƞƾƿ ƞơƿƾ. 
They are also called absolute theories because they assert that punishment 
does not have to serve any future societal goals. In contrast, special and gene-
ral prevention are known as relative theories because punishment always has 
to relate to a future societal goal (deterrence, safety etc.). 
These fundamentally different views on punishment led to two opposing 
schools of thought. The classical school around Kؔإ؟ B؜ءؗ؜ءؚ ᄬᇳᇺᇶᇳᅬᇳᇻᇴᇲᄭ 
advocated that punishment can and must only be concerned with retribu-
tion. Sentences are imposed because offenders need to get their just deserts 
15 kبإ؞؜ءؘؗء, p. 304
16 Jǀƾƿ Ƣƣƾƣƽƿ/ƽƣƿƽiƟǀƿiƺƹ ǂƞƾ ƿƩƣ ƾƿƞƽƿiƹƨ ƻƺiƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƞƟƾƺlǀƿƣ ƿƩƣƺƽiƣƾ ƺƤ ƻǀƹiƾƩƸƣƹƿ 
purported by Iؠؠؔءبؘ؟ Kؔءا and Gؘآإؚ Fإ؜ؘؗإ؜ؖ؛ h؜؟؛ؘ؟ؠ Hؘؘؚ؟. These the-
ories were known as “absolute” because punishment was absolved from serving any 
future societal goals. Such theorists strictly viewed punishment as a retributive act 
against the offender. Punishment was thus viewed as a necessary act of communication 
to demonstrate the condemnation of an autonomous agent who had chosen to break 
the law. 
17 Special prevention was advocated by C؛إ؜ئاآأ؛ Cؔإ؟ dاüؘؕ؟ and Kؔإ؟ ةآء Gإآ؟ؠؔء. 
They argued for a criminal law system that should effectively prevent the offender from 
reoffending. 
18 General prevention was championed by aؔب؟ Jآ؛ؔءء éءئؘ؟ؠ c؜ااؘإ ةآء Fؘبؘإؕؔؖ؛. 
He opposed special prevention because tying punishment to the offender’s future likeli-
hood of reoffending (rather than connecting punishment to the past criminal act) would 
leave the offender’s punishment entirely at the discretion of the judge. This could lead 
to perverse outcomes: for example, someone who had repeatedly committed petty theft 
could, under this principle, be imprisoned for life due to the statistical likelihood that 
they would steal again. In Fؘبؘإؕؔؖ؛’ئ opinion, however, it was permissible to try to 
educate and deter the general public through punishment. 
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for their crimes. Contrastingly, the modernists championed (special) pre-
vention as the main goal of criminal punishment. One of their strongest 
advocates, Fإؔءح ةآء L؜ئحا ᄬᇳᇺᇷᇳᅬᇳᇻᇳᇻᄭ, opposed the idea of having retri-
bution as a sole focus in his main oeuvre, ‘Purpose in Criminal Law’ (1882). 
There, he asserted that punishment must achieve at least one of the follo-
wing goals: to heal offenders, to scare them straight, or to permanently inca-
pacitate them. 
Both schools had legitimate points: the classical school rightly pointed out 
that theories of prevention turned offenders from autonomous human beings 
into mere objects, by shaping them as people into a form that better meets 
societal needs (special prevention) or by making an example out of them 
to deter criminality in the wider public (general prevention). The offender 
is used as a means to an end and is not respected as an autonomous moral 
agent. Simultaneously, the modernists were also right to assert that punish-
ment cannot be entirely detached from its effects: it must also serve societal 
ends like the reintegration of offenders. Therefore, the modernists advocated 
for the use of new instruments in the criminal law, like the employment of 
fines, parole, educational prison schemes, pedagogical rather than punitive 
sanctions for young offenders, and the protection of society from dangerous 
offenders.
Cؔإ؟ dاآآئئ’ landmark achievement was to accommodate both schools’ 
beliefs in his dual system of sanctions, formalised in the Criminal Code.19 
Sentences should serve the purpose of retribution, while measures must serve 
societal ends like reintegration or maintaining safety. 
ᇷ. Dؘؔا؛ aؘءؔ؟اج
The most controversial sanction is capital punishment. Today, the death pen-
alty is prohibited (Article 10 I Constitution).20 In 2002, Switzerland ratified 
Protocol No 13 to the ECHR, concerning the abolition of the death penalty in 
all circumstances.
19 kبإ؞؜ءؘؗء, p. 304.
20 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999, SR 101; see for an English 
ǁƣƽƾiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ǂǂǂ.ƞƢƸiƹ.ơƩ ᄬƩƿƿƻƾ://ƻƣƽƸƞ.ơơ/MᇺfJ- dᇵᇸᇻᄭ.
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eƩƽƺǀƨƩƺǀƿ ƿƩƣ MiƢƢlƣ éƨƣƾ ƞƹƢ iƹƿƺ ƸƺƢƣƽƹ ƿiƸƣƾ, ƿƩƣ ƢƣƞƿƩ ƻƣƹƞlƿǄ ǂƞƾ 
commonly employed in Switzerland. It also holds the unfortunate record of 
being the last country in Europe to have executed a person for witchcraft: 
Oƹ ᇳᇵ Jǀƹƣ ᇳᇹᇺᇴ éءءؔ Gö؟ؗ؜21 was beheaded immediately after the council 
of Glarus had convicted her of witchery. Of course, she had only confessed 
under torture. 
Later, both the Code pénal of 1799 and the cantonal criminal codes of the 
early 19th century provided for the death penalty in the case of crimes like 
murder, aggravated robbery, or arson. Beheading by sword or guillotine was 
the most common means of execution. Under the influence of enlighten-
ment thinkers like Bؘؖؖؔإ؜ؔ and gآ؟اؔ؜إؘ, the Federal Constitution of 1848 
banned the death penalty for political crimes. In the following decades, seve-
ral cantons22 entirely abolished it. Further, in 1874, Article 65 of the Federal 
Constitution issued a total ban. Yet, unfortunately, this prohibition only las-
ted for a couple of years. After a series of murder cases in the late 1870s, the 
ban on the death penalty was revoked by popular vote. Henceforth, the death 
penalty, again, was only forbidden for political crimes. This led to several can-
tons reintroducing capital punishment.23
In the making of the Swiss Criminal Code, the death penalty was subject 
to fierce debate, but the ultimate decision was to ban it in all cases, for 
all crimes. This decision was made in 1937 by the federal legislator, even 
though up until 1999,24 the Constitution would have allowed the death 
21 éءءؔ Gö؟ؗ؜ was employed as a maid by Jآ؛ؔءء Jؔ؞آؕ eئؖ؛بؗ؜, a rich physician and 
politician in Glarus. She was accused of having put needles in the milk of eئؖ؛بؗ؜’s 
daughter, although later examinations of the case suggest that eئؖ؛بؗ؜ may have been 
conducting an extra- marital affair with Gö؟ؗ؜ and that this may have been the actual 
cause of the accusation of witchcraft. Differing recollections of this case are unclear on 
whether éءء ’ؔs last name was Gö؟ؗ؜ or Gö؟ؗ؜ء. 
22 IƹơlǀƢiƹƨ FƽiƟƺǀƽƨ, NƣǀơƩǈƿƣl, kǀƽiơƩ, eiơiƹƺ, Gƣƹƣǁƞ, Bƞƾƣl dƿƞƢƿ, Bƞƾƣl LƞƹƢƾơƩƞƤƿ, 
and Solothurn. 
23 éƻƻƣƹǅƣll IƹƹƣƽƽƩƺƢƣƹ, OƟǂƞlƢƣƹ, dơƩǂǄǅ, kǀƨ, dƿ.è Gƞllƣƹ, Lǀơƣƽƹƣ, gƞlƞiƾ, 
Schaffhausen, and Fribourg.
24 Switzerland ratified the “Second Option Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
ƞƹƢ aƺliƿiơƞl ciƨƩƿƾ, ƞiƸiƹƨ ƞƿ ƿƩƣ ƞƟƺliƿiƺƹ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƞƿƩ ƻƣƹƞlƿǄ” ƺƹ ᇳᇸ Jǀƹƣ ᇳᇻᇻᇶ. eƩiƾ 
protocol obliges state parties to take all necessary measures to abolish the death penalty 
within their jurisdiction, during both war and peace time. Switzerland implemented the 
protocol into the revision of the Swiss Federal Constitution of 20th November 1996, but 
ƿƩƣ Cƺƹƾƿiƿǀƿiƺƹ ƢiƢ ƹƺƿ ƤƺƽƸƞllǄ ƣƹƿƣƽ iƹƿƺ Ƥƺƽơƣ ǀƹƿil ᇳ JƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇲ. 
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penalty to be used as the means of punishment for all crimes except poli-
tical ones. 
For the cantons, the enactment of the Swiss Criminal Code meant that 
their provisions on the death penalty would become invalid (Article 336 lit. b 
Criminal Code of 1937). However, in the time between Parliament’s decision 
to abolish the death penalty (21 December 1937) and the official enactment 
ƺƤ ƿƩƣ dǂiƾƾ CƽiƸiƹƞl CƺƢƣ ᄬᇳ JƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇳᇻᇶᇴᄭ, ƿǂƺ Ƹƺƽƣ ơƺƹǁiơƿƣƢ ƸǀƽƢƣƽƣƽƾ 
were executed. The last execution mandated under civic jurisdiction was that 
of Hؔءئ gآ؟؟ؘءتؘ؜ؘؗإ, an offender who had killed a young policeman. In 
the early morning of 18 October 1940, at the prison of Sarnen in Obwalden, he 
ascended the scaffold. This execution was highly contested: even the widow 
of the policeman had asked for a pardon. Furthermore, the Federal Criminal 
CƺƢƣ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ MiliƿƞƽǄ ƞllƺǂƣƢ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƞƿƩ ƻƣƹƞlƿǄ ǀƹƿil ᇳᇻᇻᇴ. Dǀƽiƹƨ ƞƹƢ ƞƤƿƣƽ 
World War II, 35 persons were sentenced to death for military crimes such as 
high treason, and 17 of them were executed. 
éƾ ƸƣƹƿiƺƹƣƢ ƞƟƺǁƣ, dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ Ʃƞƾ ƹƺǂ, ƞƾ ƺƤ ᇵ MƞǄ ᇴᇲᇲᇴ, ƽƞƿiƤiƣƢ 
Protocol 13 of the ECHR, thereby committing to banning the death penalty 
in all circumstances without the possibility of derogation. There is not, 
however, total clarity regarding the extent to which this Protocol would 
prevent Switzerland from re- introducing the death penalty. Some argue 
that the Swiss Constitution could be modified by a popular initiative 
(Article 139 Constitution) in a way that explicitly and intentionally viola-
tes Protocol 13, which would allow Switzerland to reintroduce the death 
penalty.25 
Aside from this legal issue, public debate over the use of the death penalty 
continues. In 1985, a popular initiative26 “to Save our Youth” was launched to 
reinstate the death penalty for selling hard drugs. The committee, however, 
25 This sort of argument makes use of the so called Schubert exception, which is discussed 
in the chapter on International Relations on pp. 179.). The case establishes that where the 
Federal Assembly has intentionally enacted legislation which violates the treaty obliga-
tion, the authorities shall apply the federal act. The Schubert exception does not apply 
in the case of treaties which guarantee fundamental rights, such as the ECHR; the rights 
conferred by such instruments must be respected in all cases. However, there has been 
no explicit decision as of yet regarding whether the Schubert exception would apply to 
a conflict between a treaty, even one which guarantees fundamental rights, and the 
Constitution. 
26 Then Article 121 II Constitution of 1874; today: Article 139 Constitution.
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failed to collect the necessary 100’000 signatures. In 2010, the family mem-
bers of a murder victim started a popular initiative entitled “Death Penalty 
Ƥƺƽ MǀƽƢƣƽ ǂiƿƩ dƣǃǀƞl éƟǀƾƣ”. Iƿ ƿǀƽƹƣƢ ƺǀƿ ƿƺ ƞơƿǀƞllǄ Ɵƣ ƞ ac- ƾƿǀƹƿ ƿƺ ƽƞiƾƣ 
awareness for victims of such a crime, and their families. Nevertheless, it once 
again sparked huge controversy. 
ᇸ. Eبا؛ؔءؔئ؜ؔ / Aئئ؜ئاؘؗ dب؜ؖ؜ؘؗ
A further particularity worth discussing is the Swiss regulation on euthanasia 
and assisted suicide. Regarding suicidal persons themselves, as Cؔإ؟ dاآآئئ 
had stated already in 1894: they “deserve pity, not punishment.” Thus, attemp-
ted suicide is not a crime under Swiss Law. It was, however, at the time of draf-
ting the Criminal Code, a matter of some controversy whether this removal of 
criminal liability should also be stretched to cover persons who aid and abet 
suicide.
The legislator decided that helping someone to die out of compassion and 
empathy should not constitute criminal wrongdoing. The legality of assis-
ted suicide results from Article 115 e contrario: any person who, for selfish 
motives, incites or assists another person to commit suicide is liable to a 
custodial sentence of up to five years or to a monetary penalty. Criminal 
liability is only warranted if the incitement or assistance to suicide is driven 
by selfish motives: for example, the possibility of financial gain. Due to this 
regulation, a physician who provides a person who wishes to die with a let-
hal dose of Natrium- Pentobarbital (NaP) is not liable. Nor are organisations 
such as Exit or Dignitas that provide comfort and assistance in suicide, as 
long as they operate on a non- profit basis. However, family members who 
help their loved- ones commit suicide, even by simply accompanying them 
to an organisation like Dignitas, are put at risk by this provision: due to 
their likely position as heirs to the suicidal individual, they might be viewed 
as having acted for selfish motives even if, in reality, they were spurred by 
compassion. 
PƞƺƺƩƽƢ  ƢƼƻƨƞƵƞƺƩƞ) is also allowed by Swiss criminal law. This term 
refers to situations in which death ensues from a deliberate decision not 
to intervene or not to pursue life- saving measures, where the failure to 
act corresponds with the will of the person concerned. For example, when 
a person with a heart attack has refused CPR, or an elderly person with 
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pneumonia refuses to be treated with antibiotics, or the parenteral nutri-
tion of a person in coma is discontinued, where this is what the coma pati-
ent himself would have wished. Generally under Swiss law, a deliberate 
failure to save someone’s life can lead to criminal responsibility for homi-
cide by omission (Articles 111 et seqq.).27 This applies only when the person 
failing to act is under a legal or contractual obligation to safeguard the 
victim’s life (Article 11). Physicians or spouses would generally have such 
an obligation. However, in the circumstances outlined above, criminal 
responsibility is not incurred. Their general obligation to act to safeguard 
life is outweighed by the fact that intervening against the patient’s will 
in such a case would in itself constitute a crime (for example, assault or 
coercion). 
AƠƻƩƽƢ ƢƼƻƨƞƵƞƺƩƞ)is not permitted by Swiss criminal law. This term refers 
to situations where a person’s death is caused by a wilful act, where this 
act was requested by the person. An example would be the administra-
tion of a lethal injection to a person who wishes to die.28 Actively killing 
someone is a crime under Swiss law, even if the “victim” explicitly asks to 
be killed. According to Article 114 (“Homicide at the request of the victim”), 
any person who for commendable motives, and in particular out of compas-
sion, causes the death of a person at that person’s own genuine and insis-
tent request is liable to a custodial sentence of up to three years or to a 
monetary penalty. When this rule was drafted in the early 20th century, the 
legislators decided that “the principle that all life is untouchable” prevented 
them from legalising consensual killings. There is, however, a substantially 
reduced sentence; killing someone who has given their consent is only a 
misdemeanour. 
There are two key problems with the law’s absolute prohibition on 
active euthanasia in Switzerland. Firstly, contrary to what the legislators 
of the early 20th century claimed to be the case, it is clear that life is not 
“untouchable” under Swiss law. This is illustrated by, for example, the law 
on passive euthanasia or the legality of killing in self- defence (Article 15). 
Secondly, it is highly controversial whether turning off a life- sustaining 
27 Liability can also ensue from Article 128 (“AƵǀ)ƷƢƹƺƶƵ)ƾƨƶ)ƣƞƩƳƺ)ƻƶ)ƶƣƣƢƹ)ƞƩơ)ƻƶ)ƞƵƶƻƨƢƹ … ƾƨƶ)
is in immediate life- threatening danger, in circumstances where the person either could 
reasonably have been expected to offer aid.”).
28 JǀƢƨƣƸƣƹƿ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ BƣǅiƽkƾƨƣƽiơƩƿ DiƣlƾƢƺƽƤ/kH, ᇳᇷ DƣơƣƸƟƣƽ ᇴᇲᇲᇵ ᄬNƽ. GGᇲᇵᇲᇲᇹᇸᄭ.
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machine is to be viewed as an active behaviour punishable by Article 114. 
It has been argued that such an action simply allows the person’s health 
condition to kill them, rather than the removal of the machine being the 
cause of death.29 Further, arguably removing any life- sustaining measures 
iƾ ƸƺƽƞllǄ ƣƼǀiǁƞlƣƹƿ ƿƺ ƹƣǁƣƽ Ɵƣƨiƹƹiƹƨ ƿƩƣƸ iƹ ƿƩƣ Ƥiƽƾƿ ƻlƞơƣè ᅬ ǂƩiơƩ 
Swiss law permits. Today, the debate on whether the active killing of per-
sons who are unable to kill themselves can be justified rages on.
29 As was argued in the famous British case of Airedale National Health Service Trust v 
Bland (1993) 1 All ER 821 by the House of Lords, concerning the removal of life- sustaining 
treatment from a 17 year old boy in a persistent vegetative state: e.g. see Lord Goff at 867. 
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II. aƽiƹơiƻlƣƾ
This section discusses key principles followed in the Swiss legal system. Two 
of the main principles in Swiss criminal law are the principle of legality (1.) 
and the principle of no punishment without culpability (2.). The principle of 
legality contains many sub- principles which will be further analysed; subse-
quently, the notion of culpability itself in Swiss law is examined.
ᇳ. Nب؟؟ؔ aآؘءؔ d؜ءؘ Lؘؘؚ
Swiss criminal law is first of all dominated by the principle of legality. éƽƿiơlƣ èᇳ 
states that sanctions (i.e. sentences and measures) may only be imposed for a 
behaviour that the law explicitly threatens with punishment.30 Article 1 thus 
encompasses two principles. Firstly, there is the principle of nullum crimen 
sine lege: no act or omission shall be considered a crime unless the law expli-
citly says so. For example, today there is no rule in the Swiss criminal code 
prohibiting homosexual acts.31 Thus, they are not a crime and courts cannot 
declare them illegal. Secondly, Article 1 contains the principle nulla poena 
sine lege: no penalty without law. This principle stipulates that all sanctions 
imposed for criminal acts must be provided for in the law. For example, the 
death penalty has been abolished in Switzerland. This means that no one in 
Switzerland can be sentenced to death, even for the most heinous crime. 
30 The “official” translation of Article 1 by the Swiss Government is incorrect in many ways: 
“No penalty (recte: sanction) without a law. No one may be punished (recte: no sanctions 
may be imposed) for an act (recte: or omission) unless it has been expressly declared to 
be an offence (recte: by the law).” 
31 The Swiss Criminal Code of 21 December 1937 abolished the criminal liability of homo-
sexuality between adults and introduced an age of consent of 20 years, as opposed to 16 
years in the case of sexual acts between opposite- sex partners. With the criminal law 
reform of 1990, the age of consent was lowered to 16 years. 
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Figure 4: Principle of Legality
The nulla poena sine lege principle is commonly used as a pars pro toto term 
which encompasses the nullum crimen principle as well. The nulla poena sine 
lege principle has been refined into a set of sub- principles that have a strong 
impact on the practical application of the criminal law.
The first sub- principle of nulla poena sine lege is the nulla poena sine 
lege scripta principle: no penalty without written law. This principle preclu-
des the creation or existence of customary criminal law; all crimes must 
be laid down by a formal Act of Parliament. For example, several canto-
nal criminal codes used to prohibit extra- marital sexual relations: such a 
prohibition could not be reintroduced today by declaring it a customary 
criminal rule. 
The second sub- principle is the nulla poena sine lege praevia principle: no 
penalty without pre- existing law. In general, criminal law may not be applied 
retroactively (Article 2 I) unless the new provision is more lenient (Article 2 
II). For example, since 1 October 2002, abortions have been completely lega-
liƾƣƢ Ƣǀƽiƹƨ ƿƩƣ Ƥiƽƾƿ ᇳᇴ ǂƣƣkƾ ƺƤ ƿƩƣ ƻƽƣƨƹƞƹơǄèᄬƟƣƤƺƽƣ ƿƩiƾ, ƞƟƺƽƿiƺƹƾ ǂƣƽƣ 
only permitted for medical reasons). Because the new 12- weeks- rule is milder, 
it could be applied retroactively. 
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The third sub- principle is the the nulla poena sine lege certa/stricta prin-
ciple, which demands that the elements of a crime and the sanctions which 
apply to it be clearly defined. Addressees of rules must get a fair warning: they 
must know exactly what the consequences of their actions will be. An example 
of a provision which infringes this principle is Article 303, which imposes an 
unspecified monetary or custodial sentence for false accusations. An offen-
der can face any sentence from 3 units of monetary penalty to 20 years of 
imprisonment. The nulla poena sine lege certa/stricta principle also prohi-
bits criminal law operating on the basis of analogies. For example, Article 215 
prohibits bigamy: this prohibition could not be extended to cohabitation by 
ƞƹƞlƺƨǄ, ƿƺ Ƹƣƣƿ ƞ ơƞƾƣ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƞ ǂƺƸƞƹ Ʃƞƾ ƿǂƺ ƟƺǄƤƽiƣƹƢƾ ƞƿ ƞèƿiƸƣ. 
ᇴ. Nب؟؟ؔ aآؘءؔ d؜ءؘ Cب؟أؔ 
“Punishment without guilt is nonsense, barbarism”, wrote Eإءئا Hؙؔاؘإ, one 
of the early and influential criminal law scholars in Switzerland, in 1946. The 
principle nulla poena sine culpa (keine Strafe ohne Schuld; no punishment 
without culpability) is crucial to Swiss criminal law. In fact, to understand 
the notion of Schuld is to understand the concept of Swiss criminal law itself. 
Schuld has many different meanings; it can be used interchangeably to con-
vey notions like culpability, guilt, blame, fault, and responsibility.
Figure 5: Criminal Liabilty
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Criminal liability in Swiss law is a three- stage concept: all three stages of 
the test must be met in order for criminal liability to apply. First, the objec-
tive and subjective elements of the crime (Tatbestandsmässigkeit) have to be 
ƣƾƿƞƟliƾƩƣƢ: Ʃƞƾ ƿƩƣ ǁiơƿiƸ Ɵƣƣƹ killƣƢ ƟǄ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƤƣƹƢƞƹƿèᄬƺƟjƣơƿiǁƣ ƣlƣƸƣƹƿ; 
“actus reus”)? Did the defendant kill the victim intentionally (subjective ele-
ment; “mens rea”)? Second, the unlawfulness (Rechtswidrigkeit) of the act has 
to be determined. Did the defendant kill in legitimate self- defence? Was a 
theft of food warranted by the necessity to survive? Did the masochist con-
sent to violent sexual practices? Third, the culpability (Schuld) of the offender 
has to be assessed. Can the defendant be blamed for the act? Perpetrators can 
only be held responsible for their unlawful acts if they were able to both grasp 
the demands imposed on them by legal rules and act accordingly (Article 19). 
Culpability can be excluded on three different grounds. The first ground 
is the defendant’s lack of criminal responsibility. If wrongdoers are unable to 
understand the wrongfulness of their act they cannot be held to account. An 
ƣǃƞƸƻlƣ ƺƤ ƿƩiƾ iƾ ǂƩƣƹ ƿƩƣ ƺƤƤƣƹƢƣƽ Ʃƞƾ ƞ ƾƣǁƣƽƣlǄ lƺǂ Ib. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, iƿ ƾƩƺǀlƢ 
be noted that this ground is not often accepted by courts. Children under the 
ƞƨƣ ƺƤ ƿƣƹ ƞƽƣ lƣƨƞllǄ ƣǃơlǀƢƣƢ ƤƽƺƸ ơƽiƸiƹƞl ƽƣƾƻƺƹƾiƟiliƿǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇵ Jǀǁƣƹilƣ 
Criminal Law Act)32. Their inability to fully assess wrongfulness is presumed 
by law. Criminal responsibility is also excluded if a person is able to assess 
wrongfulness but is unable to act accordingly. In most cases where culpability 
is excluded, it is under this ground of inability to control one’s actions des-
pite knowing they are wrong. This ability to restrain oneself may be absent 
in some manifestations of paranoid schizophrenia. Further, it can be absent 
where the defendant is under the influence of extreme emotions and acts in 
the heat of the moment. The typical example of this latter sort of case is where 
the defendant, just previously to committing an offence of assault, has found 
ƺǀƿ ƿƩƞƿ Ʃiƾ/Ʃƣƽ ƻƞƽƿƹƣƽ iƾ ơƺƹƢǀơƿiƹƨ ƞƹ ƞƤƤƞiƽ. 
The second ground for the exclusion of culpability is an error of law. Again, 
in this situation the person is not aware of the wrongfulness of their act. Yet 
the reason for this failure is not a mental deficiency: instead, it is missing or 
incorrect information about the law. However, the standard is high. Error of 
law is only accepted as grounds for excluding culpability if the perpetrator 
both did not and, crucially, could not have known that he or she was acting 
unlawfully. In a famous case from 1978, a 19- year- old Sicilian immigrant had 
sex with a 15- year- old Swiss girl. He successfully claimed that he did not know 
32 Jǀǁƣƹilƣ CƽiƸiƹƞl Lƞǂ éơƿ ƺƤ ᇴᇲ Jǀƹƣ ᇴᇲᇲᇵ, dc ᇵᇳᇳ.ᇳ.
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the concept of the legal age of consent. He had thought that sexual intercourse 
with a minor was only punishable if he did not intend to marry his sexual 
partner.33 It is highly questionable whether the Federal Supreme Court would 
still rule today that this man could not have known that his act was illegal. 
Thirdly, culpability is excluded if the wrongdoer could not have been rea-
sonably expected to act lawfully. An example of when this unreasonableness 
standard can be met is where a perpetrator kills a person in order to save 
his or her own life. Had the famous English R v. Dudley and Stephens case 
of 188434èᅬ ǂƩƣƽƣ ƿƩƽƣƣ ƾƩiƻǂƽƣơkƣƢ ƾƞilƺƽƾ killƣƢ ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣƹ ƞƿƣ ƞ ơƞƟiƹ ƟƺǄ 
ƿƺ ƞǁƺiƢ ƾƿƞƽǁƞƿiƺƹèᅬ Ɵƣƣƹ jǀƢƨƣƢ iƹ dǂiƿǅƣƽlƞƹƢ, ƿƩƣ ƢƣƤƣƹƢƞƹƿƾ ǂƺǀlƢ Ʃƞǁƣ 
had to be acquitted. Though the killing was unlawful, it would have been 
excusable under Swiss law to end the boy’s life in such extreme circumstan-
ces, meaning the defendants would not have met the culpability test. They 
could not reasonably have been expected to sacrifice their own lives, by not 
killing and eating the cabin boy. 
There is one hugely intriguing problem regarding culpability which remains 
unsolved. If culpability is about blaming someone for having acted unlaw-
fully, then it must be established that this person could have acted differently. 
In other words, culpability hinges on free will; there can be no culpability 
without freedom of will. If, as some believe, our actions are predetermined, 
then we cannot be blamed for having “chosen” to do something illegal. The 
current state of knowledge allows us neither to prove nor disprove freedom of 
will. Currently, the notion that any perpetrator could have chosen to behave 
otherwise is therefore merely presumed as an “inevitable fiction” in (Swiss) 
criminal law.
33 BGE 104 IV 217.
34 c ǁ. DǀƢlƣǄ ƞƹƢ dƿƣƻƩƣƹƾ ᄬᇳᇺᇺᇶᄭ ᇳᇶ bBD ᄬbǀƣƣƹ’ƾ BƣƹơƩ Diǁiƾƺƹᄭ ᇴᇹᇵ DC.
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III. LƞƹƢƸƞƽk Cƞƾƣƾ
The Federal Supreme Court in Lausanne is Switzerland’s highest court. Its cri-
minal law division was formerly known as the Court of Cassation. In dealing 
with criminal law, its main task is to secure the consistent application of the 
Swiss Criminal Code throughout Switzerland. In the following paragraphs, 
some landmark rulings of the Federal Supreme Court will be discussed. 
ᇳ. cآ؟؟؜ءؚ dاآءؘئ35
In the evening of 21 April 1983, two men (A and B) were on their way home 
ƤƽƺƸ ƿƩƣiƽ ơƞƟiƹ iƹ ƿƩƣ eöƾƾ ƽiǁƣƽ ǁƞllƣǄ ƹƣƞƽ kǀƽiơƩ. eƩƣǄ ƾƻƺƿƿƣƢ ƿǂƺ Ɵiƨ 
stones (individually weighing 52 kg and 100 kg) at the top of slope so steep 
that the bottom was not visible. They decided to roll these stones down the 
slope. A pushed the 52 kg stone down the hill, whilst B pushed the heavier, 100 
kg stone. One of these stones struck and killed a fisherman at the foot of the 
slope. However, it could not be established which of the two stones had killed 
ƩiƸ, ƞƹƢ ƿƩƣƽƣƤƺƽƣ ǂƩƺèᅬ é ƺƽ Bèᅬ ƩƞƢ Ɵƣƣƹ ƽƣƾƻƺƹƾiƟlƣ Ƥƺƽ ƿƩƣ ƢƣƞƿƩ.
When the case came before the Supreme Court, the judges held that A and 
B were criminally liable as co- offenders for negligent homicide. Up until that 
ruling, the notion of co- offending was strictly limited to intentional crimes. 
This seemed logical because the conventional view of co- offending generally 
requires the existence of a conspiracy: at least two persons who embark on a 
common criminal pursuit. However, in the “rolling stones” case there was no 
joint decision (conspiracy) to kill the fisherman. By deciding to roll the stones 
down the slope, A and B jointly engaged in a grossly negligent behaviour that 
caused the death of the fisherman. The Supreme Court ruling was an attempt 
to overcome problems of evidence, by employing the tools of the substantive 
criminal law.36 
35 BGE 113 IV 58.
36 Concurring that the Supreme Court’s reasoning was f lawed, aؘاإ؜ؚ/kبإ؞؜ءؘؗء argue 
that it would have been better to hold A and B liable for negligent, parallel perpetration 
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ᇴ. Dآؠؘئا؜ؖ eجإؔءا37
i ǂƞƾ ƞ ǁƣƽǄ ƻƺƺƽlǄ iƹƿƣƨƽƞƿƣƢ iƸƸiƨƽƞƹƿ ƤƽƺƸ Kƺƾƺǁƺ. dƩƣ ǂƞƾ ƸƞƽƽiƣƢ ƿƺ 
Y, whom she had five children with. Y constantly abused X: he beat her with 
the cable of a vacuum cleaner, he threw a butcher’s knife at her, he banned her 
ƤƽƺƸ lƣƞǁiƹƨ ƿƩƣ Ʃƺǀƾƣ ƞƹƢ ƿƺƽƣ ǀƻ Ʃƣƽ ƻƞƾƾƻƺƽƿ. Iƹ JƞƹǀƞƽǄ ᇳᇻᇻᇵ, Ʃƣ ƿƺlƢ ƿƩƣiƽ 
eldest daughter that her mother was going to die during the course of that 
Ǆƣƞƽ. Oƹ ᇳᇷ MƞƽơƩ ᇳᇻᇻᇵ, j ƾƩƺǂƣƢ Ʃiƾ ǂiƤƣ ƞ ƽƣǁƺlǁƣƽ Ʃƣ ƩƞƢ ƟƺǀƨƩƿ iƹ ƺƽƢƣƽ ƿƺ 
kill her. He then put it under his pillow and went to sleep. At one o’clock in the 
morning, X took the revolver and shot Y dead while he was sleeping. 
The Supreme Court ruled that X had acted in a state of excusable necessity 
ƿƺ ƣƹƢ Ʃƣƽ ƾǀƤƤƣƽiƹƨ. eƩƣ killiƹƨ ƺƤ Ʃƣƽ ƩǀƾƟƞƹƢ ǂƞƾ ǀƹlƞǂƤǀl ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇳᇵèᅬ 
manslaughter): there was no legal justification for her actions. She had not 
acted in legitimate self- defence (Article 15) for Y was not imminently about 
ƿƺ ƞƿƿƞơk Ʃƣƽ. Hƺǂƣǁƣƽ, ƾƩƣ ƢiƢ ƹƺƿ ƞơƿ ơǀlƻƞƟlǄ ᄬéƽƿiơlƣ ᇳᇻèᅬ ƣǃơǀƾƞƟlƣ ƞơƿ iƹ 
a situation of necessity). She was excused because her life was in danger and 
she saw no other way out.38 
This 1995 case seems to send out a very strong message against domestic 
violence. However, its applicability should not be over- interpreted. X’s situa-
tion was extreme: the law would normally still expect victims of abuse to call 
for help before resorting to such an act. 
ᇵ. Dؘؔؗ؟ج Cؔإ cؘؔؖ39
In the late evening on 3 September 1999, two motorists who had never met 
before and who were both driving a Volkswagen Corrado started a car race on 
a cross- country road near Lucerne. As the two drivers were approaching the 
ǁillƞƨƣ ƺƤ GƣlƤiƹƨƣƹ ƞƿ ƞ ƾƻƣƣƢ ƺƤ ƞƻƻƽƺǃiƸƞƿƣlǄ ᇳᇵᇲkƸ/Ʃ, ƺƹƣ Ƣƽiǁƣƽ ƾƺǀƨƩƿ ƿƺ 
overtake the other. He subsequently lost control of his car, which veered onto 
the sidewalk and hit two teenagers who were killed instantly. 
ƟǄ ƺƸiƾƾiƺƹèᅬ ƿƩiƾ ƻƽƣƾǀƻƻƺƾƣƾ é ƞƹƢ B ƞƽƣ iƹ “ƨǀƞƽƞƹƿƺƽ” ƻƺƾiƿiƺƹ Ƣǀƣ ƿƺ ƿƩƣ Ƥƞơƿ ƿƩƣǄ 
both created a risk (i.e. they would incur criminal liability for failing to prevent each 
other from rolling the stones down the hill), p. 124.
37 BGE 122 IV 1
38 See unreasonableness standard, p. 389.
39 BGE 130 IV 58.
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Both of the drivers were convicted of homicide (Article 111) and sentenced 
to 6.5 years of imprisonment. The Federal Supreme Court upheld this convic-
tion. For the first time in a binding precedent, persons responsible for a fatal 
car accident were convicted of homicide with conditional intent (dolus even-
tualis). Up until that case, even accidents caused by gross carelessness were 
always classified as criminal negligence. The Supreme Court argued that not 
only did the drivers know that their behaviour was extremely dangerous, but 
that by putting achieving victory in the race above everything else, they had 
willingly accepted a deadly outcome. 
From a retributive point of view the decision can be understood. The maxi-
mum penalty of 3 years for a negligent double homicide just did not fit the 
crime. From a dogmatic point of view, however, the ruling is highly proble-
matic. The drivers knowingly incurred an extremely high risk by engaging in 
a car race. But the Court made a large leap from here: the fact that the dri-
vers knew of the risk led the Court to the conclusion that they had accepted 
the fatal outcome. To draw a straight inference from what someone knew to 
what someone wanted has far- reaching consequences for criminal liability in 
general. It is highly unlikely that the drivers wanted to kill the teenagers, or 
even that they were indifferent to such an outcome.40 It is much more likely 
that they (wrongly) trusted their driving skills and hoped for a lucky outco-
me.41 In other words, they willingly accepted the risk of death, but they did not 
accept the actual outcome of death. Thus, they should have been convicted 
for life endangerment (Article 129) which allows a maximum prison sentence 
ƺƤ ᇹ.ᇷèǄƣƞƽƾ.42 
ᇶ. H؜؞؜ءؚ ؜ء ا؛ؘ Nبؘؗ43
On a warm and sunny Sunday afternoon in autumn 2009, 45- year- old X was 
hiking in the nude through the mountains of Appenzell Innerrhoden. He wal-
ked by a fire- pit where a family with young children was resting and past a 
40 As is required for the offender to possess conditional intent, see p. 375. 
41 See BGE 133 IV 9
42 According to Article 129, this crime can mandate a custodial sentence not exceeding five 
years or a monetary penalty. In cases of multiple endangerment or when committed in 
combination with other offences, this maximum sentence can be elevated by 150 %, i.e. 
it can be up to 7.5 years (see Article 49).
43 BGE 138 IV 13.
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Christian rehabilitation centre for people with drug- addictions. A woman 
who observed him filed a report with the local police. 
Article 19 of the relevant cantonal code which regulated “indecent behavi-
our” provided that “any person publicly displaying indecent behaviour is liable 
to a fine.” The Federal Supreme Court first considered whether the Canton 
of Appenzell Innerrhoden had exceeded its legislative powers by legislating 
on indecent behaviour, considering the fact that the Federal Parliament has 
exclusive legislative competence in the field of sexual offences. The court 
found that because walking in the nude did not qualify as exhibitionism, 
sexual harassment, or pornography, the cantonal legislator possessed the 
power to legislate on indecency. Secondly, the Court considered whether the 
notion of “indecent behaviour” in Article 19 was sufficiently clear to satisfy 
the nulla poena sine lege principle. They held that the provision was suffi-
ciently clear, deeming walking in the nude as obviously indecent behaviour. 
Both of the Court’s assessments are questionable. When considering the 
issue of the canton’s competence to legislate on indecent behaviour, it should 
be noted that the Federal Parliament generally restricted sexual offences to 
harmful behaviour (rape, sexual harassment, etc.). Parliament made some 
specific exceptions (e.g. exhibitionism, pornography) to this general rule: this 
can be interpreted as the federal legislator setting the outer limit for the cri-
minalisation of immoral conduct. Hence, following this view, there was no 
room for a cantonal rule on indecent behaviour: Appenzell Innerrhoden had 
acted out- with their legislative competence. Regarding the Court’s ruling that 
Article 19 was sufficiently clear to satisfy the principle of nulla poena sine lege, 
here they missed the key point. The question was not whether hiking in the 
nude can be classified as indecent behaviour, but whether such a classifica-
tion was foreseeable given the broad and changeable notion of “indecency”. If 
the legislator wants to ban walking in the nude, they must and should issue 
an unambiguous rule, for example: “Any person who displays nudity in public 
is liable to a fine.” 
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